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Abstract
We study the effects of endogenous cost formation in the classic Cournot oligopoly through an extended
two-stage game. The competing Cournot firms produce low-cost but limited quantities of a single homogeneous
product. For additional procurements, they may refer to a revenue-maximizing supplier who sets a wholesale
price prior to their orders. We express this chain as a two-stage game and study its equilibrium under two different
information levels: complete and incomplete information on the side of the supplier about the actual market
demand. In the deterministic case, we derive the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for different values
of the retailers’ capacity levels, supplier’s cost and market demand. To study the incomplete information case, we
model demand uncertainty via a continuous probability distribution. Under mild assumptions, we characterize
the supplier’s optimal pricing policy as a fixed point of a proper translation of his expectation about the orders
that he will receive from the retailers. If this expectation is decreasing in his price, then such an optimal policy
always exists and is unique. Based on this characterization, we are able to proceed with comparative statics and
sensitivity analysis, both analytically and numerically. Incomplete information gives rise to market inefficiencies
because the supplier may ask for a too high price. Increasing supplier’s cost results in increasing wholesale prices,
decreasing orders from the retailers and hence decreasing consumer surplus. Increasing retailers’ production
capacities results in decreasing wholesale prices and increasing consumer surplus. Finally, as the number of
second-stage retailers increases, the supplier’s profit may initially rise but eventually drops.
Keywords: Cournot Nash, Nash Equilibrium, Duopoly, Capacity, Inventory, Incomplete Information, Decreasing
Mean Residual Life, Existence, Uniqueness
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91A10, 91A40
1 Introduction
Modern oligopolistic firms build up their retail stock from various sources that may include in-house produc-
tion or procurements from large, internationally operating manufacturers. These suppliers also act strategically
by setting wholesale prices to maximize their revenues. Hence, the robustness and validity of economic intuitions
that have been obtained under classic assumptions of cost rigidity as in the standard Cournot quantity-competition
model need to be revised under more realistic, yet mathematically tractable cost structures.
The main objective of this paper is to provide the proper game-theoretic framework to study the cost formation
as a strategic decision in the standard Cournot oligopoly. To endogenize the cost, we extend the classic model
in a two-stage game. In the second stage, the competing firms produce limited quantities of the product up to a
specified capacity. For additional procurements, they refer to an external supplier, who has ample capacity but may
be uncertain about the actual demand that the retailers are facing. The supplier acts as a Stackelberg leader and sets
the wholesale price in the first stage, prior to the decision of the retailers. We study a complete and incomplete
information model and apply the subgame-perfect Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibrium concepts, respectively, to
analyze the strategic decisions of the market participants and gain economic intuition.
In a closely motivated study, [Marx and Schaffer [2015]] point out that the problem of strategic cost formation
has not yet been appropriately addressed in the quite extensive Cournot literature. The classic model’s assump-
tion of constant, exogenously given marginal cost does not reflect the complex cost structures of contemporary
∗This research has been supported by the Research Funding Program ARISTEIA II: ”Optimization of stochastic systems under partial
information and applications” of NSRF.
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economic practice. To address this issue, they study the game that arises when competing Cournot firms purchase
their inputs from a common supplier. They examine contracts, with the competing firms having the bargaining
power, and hence, their analysis departs from the present study. [Cachon and Netessine [2004]] highlight the need
for a game theoretical analysis of more dynamic settings in oligopolistic markets. They report only scarce appli-
cations of the subgame-perfect equilibrium, all in settings quite different from ours. Since then, several papers
have appeared in the relevant literature. [Esmaeli et al. [2009]] apply the Stackelberg-strategy solution concept to
study the interaction between a seller and a buyer. However, their interest shifts to investigating the impact of mar-
keting (advertising) expenditures. [Zhao et al. [2010]] study wholesale pricing schemes between manufacturers
and retailers, but their focus is on cooperative mechanisms that result in inventory coordination and supply chain
improvement.
The present paper focuses on the relationship between market demand and various costs as the key in studying
the effects of an exogenous source of supply for Cournot oligopolists. If the demand is high enough, the competing
firms may have incentive to place orders with an external supplier, depending, of course, on the price he asks. In
such a study, various questions have to be addressed: Do the firms have production capacities of their own? If
yes, then these capacities have to be assumed bounded (as they are in reality) so that need may arise for additional
procurements. Does the supplier know the actual demand the oligopolists face? If no, then he may ask for a price
that the competing firms will not accept, even if it is to his advantage not to do so. The latter question implies an
incomplete information game setup. By viewing the interaction of the competing Cournot oligopolists with their
supplier as a two-stage game, the cost parameter of the classic Cournot model is endogenized, and answers can be
worked out.
1.1 Model summary
In detail, inspired by the classic Cournot oligopoly in which producers/retailers compete over quantity, we
study the market of a homogeneous good differing from the classic model in the following ways. Each pro-
ducer/retailer may produce only a limited quantity of the good up to a specified and commonly known production
capacity. If needed, the retailers may refer to a single supplier to order additional quantities. The supplier may
produce unlimited quantities but at a higher cost than the retailers, making it best for the retailers to exhaust their
production capacities before placing additional orders. The market clears at a price that is determined by an affine
inverse demand function. The demand parameter or demand intercept is considered a random variable with a
commonly known non-atomic, i.e., continuous, distribution having a finite expectation.
Depending on the time of the demand realization, two variations of this market structure are examined, corre-
sponding to a complete and an incomplete information two-stage game. In the first stage, the supplier fixes a price
by deciding his profit margin and then, in the second stage, the retailers, knowing this price and the true value
of the demand parameter, decide their production quantity – up to capacity – and place their orders, if any. The
decisions of the producers/retailers are simultaneous. The supplier may – complete information – or may not –
incomplete information – know the true value of the demand parameter before making his decision. In the second
case, when the demand is realized after the supplier has set his price, the demand parameter or equivalently the sup-
plier’s belief about it is modelled by a continuous probability distribution. In both variations, demand uncertainty
is resolved prior to retailers’ decision. In this respect, our setup differs from the usual incomplete information
models of Cournot markets, in which demand uncertainty involves the producers, e.g., see [Einy et al. [2010]] and
references given therein.
The limited production capacities of the producers/retailers may equivalently be interpreted as inventory quan-
tities that are drawn at a fixed cost per unit. If the production capacities are 0, this is a classic Cournot model with
the cost input determined exogenously. This case exhibits independent interest and has been exhaustively treated
in a companion work, see [Leonardos and Melolidakis [2017]] and [Koki et al. [2018]]. The present market model
aims to describe a wide range of composite cost structures that are encountered in contemporary practice. The
energy market, in which domestic firms produce up to limited capacities and refer to international suppliers in
periods of high demand, agriculture, apparel, food products and numerous more examples can be thought of as
real economic applications. In all these cases, the suppliers have ample quantities to cover any domestic demand.
Hence, they only need to decide on the wholesale price that they will ask. However, due to their distance from
the retail market, they may have limited information about the actual retail demand, an aspect that we implement
by treating the demand parameter as a random variable on the side of the supplier. The realization of the demand
after the pricing decision of the supplier is the device to implement this uncertainty. The model assumptions are
further discussed in Section 8.
2
1.2 Overview of results
For a more transparent exposition, we first analyze the case of n = 2 competing retailers (duopoly) and then
generalize our results to the case of arbitrary n > 2 competing retailers (oligopoly). We study the equilibrium
behavior of the two-stage game by first determining the unique equilibrium solution of the second-stage game,
which concerns the quantities that the producers/retailers will produce and the additional quantities they will order
from the supplier. The equilibrium strategies are given in Proposition 3.3 and Figure 3. The second stage is the
same in both the complete and the incomplete information case. Then, we examine the first-stage game, which
concerns the price the supplier will ask for the product. In the case of the complete information duopoly, a unique
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium always exists, which we explicitly determine in Proposition 3.5 for all values
of production capacities T1,T2, supplier’s cost c and demand level α. While equilibrium strategies, payoffs of
the retailers, and equilibrium payoff of the supplier are continuous and increasing in the demand level α, the
supplier’s optimal pricing strategy may not be continuous and even not monotonic in α. Under the assumption
of symmetric (identical) retailers, i.e., T1 = T2 = T , the complete information case simplifies significantly. The
resulting equilibrium is given in Theorem 3.9 and allows for a discussion on the impact of the retailers’ capacities
on the consumer surplus.
Our focus is mainly on the incomplete information case. In Theorem 4.2, we show that if a subgame perfect
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists, then it will necessarily be a fixed point of a translation of the Mean Residual
Lifetime (MRL) function of the supplier’s belief. If the support of the supplier’s belief is bounded, then such an
equilibrium exists. If the MRL function is decreasing (as in most “well behaved” distributions), then a subgame
perfect equilibrium always exists and is unique, irrespective of the supplier’s belief support. The fixed point
characterization of the supplier’s equilibrium strategy provides a powerful tool for a transparent comparative
statics and sensitivity analysis.
Accordingly, in Section 5, we study market inefficiencies due to incomplete information. Through analytical
considerations and numerical simulations, we reason about the supplier’s incentives to charge a too high price,
despite running a considerable risk of no transactions between him and the retailers. In Corollary 6.1, we observe
that the supplier’s profit margin and wholesale price both exhibit a reverse monotone relationship to the retailers’
inventory level. Similarly, as the supplier’s cost increases, his profit margin decreases. However, in this case, the
wholesale price that he asks increases and the total quantity ordered by the retailers decreases, see Corollary 6.2.
Consequently, the total quantity that is sold to the consumers decreases, which has a negative impact on consumer
surplus. We confirm these observations numerically. Finally, in Theorem 7.2 we show that Theorem 4.2 gener-
alizes to an arbitrary number of second-stage retailers which enables the study of their impact on the supplier’s
profit. Numerical simulations with specific distributions reveal that while the supplier may initially benefit from
an increasing number of retailers, eventually his profits will drop as their number, and consequently their total
in-house production capacities, continue to increase. Accordingly, our main contributions can be summarized in
the following points
• formulation of a game-theoretic framework to incorporate the complex cost structure of modern oligopolistic
Cournot-firms.
• closed form characterization of the equilibria in both complete and incomplete information market settings;
• utilization of the MRL function, which, although useful to study stochastic payoff functions, has received
limited attention in the revenue management literature; and
• comparative statics and sensitivity analysis of the basic model parameters – facilitated by the previous
characterizations – to understand the economic implications of the present model, both analytically and
numerically.
Still, the complexity and variety of real economic models provide numerous possibilities for future research and
extensions. However, the proposed model aims to provide a benchmark for related studies, due to its mathematical
tractability that is mainly highlighted by the closed form characterizations of the equilibrium strategies both in the
complete and incomplete information settings. For a more detailed discussion of the economic assumptions and
possible extensions of the present model, see Section 8 and Subsection 8.1.
1.3 Related Work
The current work combines elements from various active research areas. Cournot competition with an external
supplier having uncertainty about the retail demand may be viewed as an application of game theoretic tools in
supply chain management. However, our interest is in the equilibrium behavior of the complete and incomplete
information two-stage game rather than in building coordination mechanisms. The incomplete information of the
3
supplier relates our work to incomplete information Cournot models, although the lack of information refers to
the producers in most papers in this area, see e.g., [Bernstein and Federgruen [2005]] or [Wu and Chen [2016]].
Price-only contracts between suppliers and retailers, like the one described here, continue to attract widespread
attention in the literature. [Lariviere and Porteus [2001]] argue that the simplicity of price-only contracts makes
them particularly attractive if they do not significantly reduce supply-chain efficiency. Since unmodeled factors
are unlikely to reverse the insights derived by such models, they conclude that as such, they provide (at least in
many cases) a benchmark, worst-case analysis. [Perakis and Roels [2007]] highlight the practical prevalence of
price-only contracts and study the efficiency of various decentralized supply chains that use price-only contracts
by measuring the respective Price of Anarchy of the chain. In a similar fashion to our Theorem 5.2, they obtain
bounds on the market fashion by restricting attention to the IGFR class of random variables.
[David and Adida [2015]] study a supply chain with a single supplier and symmetric retailers analytically and
find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even in several restrictive cases.
This is in contrast to our findings in Section 7, which shows that such conclusions may be model-specific. In a
similar model, [Wu et al. [2012]] investigate the pricing decisions in a non-cooperative supply chain that consists
of two retailers and one common supplier. As the supplier’s decision variables, they consider the wholesale prices
to the retailers, and argue that under active market regulations (Robinson-Patman Act) the supplier is required to
charge a uniform price – and hence not price-differentiate between the retailers – when the retailers place their
orders simultaneously, as in our model. In their approach however, each retailer’s decision is the sale price to the
market, and hence their analysis differs from ours.
Having capacity constraints for the producers/consumers has also attracted attention in the Cournot literature,
see e.g., [Bischi et al. [2009]]. [Bernstein and Federgruen [2005]] investigate the equilibrium behavior of a de-
centralized supply chain with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. Their model accounts for demand
uncertainty from the retailers’ point of view as well and focuses mainly on the design of contracts that will coor-
dinate the supply chain. Based on whether the uncertainty of the demand is resolved prior to or after the retailers’
decisions, they identify two main streams of literature. For the first stream, in which the present paper may be
placed, they refer to [Vives [2001]] for an extensive survey.
However, capacity constrained duopolies are mostly studied in view of price rather than quantity competition.
[Osborne and Pitchik [1986]], and the references therein are among the classics in this field. Equally common is
the study of models in which the capacity constraints are viewed as inventories kept by the retailers at a lower
cost. Papers in this direction focus mainly on determining optimal policies in building the inventory over more
than one period. [Hartwig et al. [2015]] and the references therein are indicative of this field of research.
[Einy et al. [2010]] examine Cournot competition under incomplete producers’ information about demand
and production costs. They provide examples of such games without a Bayesian Cournot equilibrium in pure
strategies, discuss the implication of not allowing negative prices and provide additional sufficient conditions that
will guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. [Richter [2013]] discusses Cournot competition under
incomplete producers’ information about their production capacities and proves the existence of equilibrium under
the assumption of stochastic independence of the unknown capacities. He also discusses simplifications of the
inverse demand function that result in symmetric equilibria and implications of information sharing among the
producers.
1.4 Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2–6, we discuss a market with one supplier and two
producers/retailers. In particular, in Section 2, we build up the formal setting for the market model. In Section 3,
we present some preliminary results and treat the complete information case. In Section 4, we analyze the model of
incomplete information. In Section 5, we compare the complete and incomplete information equilibrium outcomes
and study both analytically and numerically the inefficiencies that occur in the incomplete information setting. In
Section 6, we perform sensitivity analysis on the model parameters and perform numerical simulations to illustrate
the results. Finally, in Section 7, we generalize (4.2) to the case of n > 2 identical retailers and study their impact
on the supplier’s profits.
To focus on the economic and game-theoretic aspects of the analysis, all proofs are presented in A. While
proving the statements for the complete information case is by exhaustive case discrimination, the proofs concern-
ing the incomplete information case utilize probabilistic results from the theory of the mean residual life (MRL)
function and may be of independent interest. The MRL function is widely used in reliability analysis, but its
formal applications in economics are still scarce.
Throughout the rest of this paper we drop the double name “producers/retailers” and use only the term “retail-
ers”.
4
2 The Model
We consider the market of a homogenous good that consists of two producers/retailers (R1 and R2) who com-
pete over quantity (Ri places quantity Qi), and a supplier (or wholesaler) under the following assumptions.
1. The retailers may produce quantities t1 and t2 up to a capacities T1 and T2, respectively, at a common fixed
cost h per unit normalized to zero1.
2. Additionally, they may order quantities q1, q2 from the supplier at a price w set prior to and independently
of their orders. The total quantity Qi (w) , i = 1, 2 that each retailer releases to the market is equal to the sum
Qi (w) := ti (w) + qi (w)
or shortly Qi := ti + qi, where, for i = 1, 2, the variable ti ≤ Ti is the quantity that retailer Ri produces by
himself or draws from his inventory (at normalized zero cost) and qi is the quantity that the retailer Ri orders
from the supplier at price w.
3. The supplier may produce unlimited quantities of the good at a cost c per unit. We assume that the retailers
are more efficient in the production of the good or equivalently that c > h. After the normalization of the
retailers’ production cost h to 0, the rest of the parameters, i.e., w and c are also normalized. Thus, w repre-
sents a normalized price, i.e., the initial price that was set by the supplier minus the retailers’ production cost
and c a normalized cost, i.e., the supplier’s initial cost minus the retailers’ production cost. The supplier’s
profit margin r is not affected by the normalization and is equal to
r := w − c
4. After the retailers set the total quantity Q = Q1 + Q2 that will be released to the market, the market clears at
a price p that is determined by an inverse demand function, which we assume to be affine2
p = α − Q (1)
5. The demand parameter α is a non-negative random variable with finite expectation E (α) < +∞ and a
continuous cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (i.e., the measure induced on the space of α is non-
atomic). We will assume that α ≥ h for all values of α, i.e., that the demand parameter is greater or equal to
the retailers’ production cost. The latter assumption is consistent with the classic Cournot duopoly model,
which is resembled by the second stage of the game (however, the second-stage game is not a classic Cournot
duopoly due to the capacity constraints T1 and T2 and to the possibility of w > α). After normalization, in
what follows, we will use the term αH (resp. αL) to denote the lower upper bound (respectively the upper
lower bound) of the support of α.
6. The capacities T1,T2 and the distribution of the random demand parameter α are common knowledge among
the three participants of the market (the retailers and the supplier).
Based on these assumptions, a strategy si (w) for retailer Ri, i = 1, 2 is a vector valued function si(w) = (ti(w), qi(w))
or shortly a pair si = (ti, qi) for i = 1, 2. Equation (1) implies that Qi may not exceed α and hence the strategy set
S˜ i of Ri will satisfy
S˜ i ⊂ {(ti, qi) : 0 ≤ ti ≤ Ti and 0 ≤ qi + ti ≤ α} (2)
Denoting by s := (s1, s2) a strategy profile, the payoff ui (s | w) of retailer Ri, i = 1, 2 will be given by
ui (s | w) = Qi (α − Q) − wqi = Qi (α − w − Q) + wti (3)
Whenever confusion may not arise, we will write ui(s) instead of ui(s | w). A strategy for the supplier is the price w
he charges to the retailers or equivalently his profit margin r. From (3), we see that w may not exceed aH , because
otherwise the retailers will not order. Additionally, it may not be lower than c, since in that case, his payoff will
become negative. Hence, in terms of his profit margin r, the strategy set R of the supplier satisfies
R ⊂ {r : 0 ≤ r ≤ αH − c} (4)
1See Section 1 for an alternative interpretation of these quantities as inventories.
2After normalization of the slope parameter (initially denoted with β) of the inverse demand function to 1, all variables in (1) are expressed
in the units of quantity and not in monetary units and therefore any interpretations or comparisons of the subsequent results should be done
with caution.
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Consequently, a reasonable assumption is that c < αH , because otherwise, the problem becomes trivial from the
supplier’s perspective. For a given value of α, the supplier’s payoff function, stated in terms of r rather than
w = r + c, is given by
us (r | α) = r (q1 (w) + q2 (w)) (5)
On the other hand, it is not necessary for the retailers to know the exact values of c and r, and hence, from their
point of view (second-stage game), we keep the notation w = r + c. If the supplier does not know α (incomplete
information case), then his payoff function will be
us (r) := Eus (r | α) (6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of α.
2.1 Two market models with different information structure
To proceed with the formal two-stage game model, we recall that both the production/inventory capacities T1
and T2 of the retailers and the distribution of the demand parameter α are common knowledge to the three market
participants. We then have,
• Complete Information Case: The demand parameter α is realized and observed by both the supplier and
the retailers3. Then, at stage 1, the supplier fixes his profit margin r and hence his price w. His strategy set
and payoff function are given by (4) and (5). At stage 2, based on the value of w, each competing retailer
chooses the quantity Qi, i = 1, 2 that he will release to the market by determining how much quantity ti
he will draw (at zero cost) from his inventory Ti and how much additional quantity qi he will order (at
price w) from the supplier. The strategy sets and payoff functions of the retailers are given by (2) and (3),
respectively.
• Incomplete Information Case: At stage 1, the supplier chooses r without knowing the true value of α. His
strategy set remains the same, but his payoff function is now given by (6). After r, and hence w = r + c, are
fixed, the demand parameter α is realized, and along with the price w is observed by the retailers. Then we
proceed to stage 2, which is identical to that of the Complete Information Case.
All the above are assumed to be common knowledge of the three players.
3 Subgame-perfect equilibria under complete information
First, we treat the case with no uncertainty on the side of the supplier about the demand parameter α. The
subgame perfect equilibria of this two-stage game are determined in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2. As is intuitively
expected, it is best for the retailers to produce up to their capacity constraints or equivalently to exhaust their
inventories before ordering additional quantities from the supplier at unit price w. For simplicity in the notation
of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, fix i ∈ {1, 2} and let Ti := T . As above, Qi = ti + qi.
Lemma 3.1. Any strategy si = (ti, qi) ∈ S˜ i with ti < T and qi > 0 is strictly dominated by a strategy s′i =
(
t′i , q
′
i
)
with
(
t′i , q
′
i
)
=
(T,Qi − T ) , if Qi ≥ T(Qi, 0) , if Qi < T
or equivalently by
(
t′i , q
′
i
)
=
(
min {Qi,T }, (Qi − T )+).
Proof. Let Qi ≥ T . Then for any s j ∈ S˜ j, (3) implies that ui
(
si, s j
)
= ui
(
s′i , s j
)
+ w (ti − T ). Since ti < T , the
result follows. Similarly, if Qi < T , then for any s j ∈ S˜ j, (3) implies that ui
(
si, s j
)
= ui
(
s′i , s j
)
− wqi. 
Accordingly, we restrict attention to the strategies in
S i =
{
(ti, qi) : 0 ≤ ti < min {α,T }, qi = 0
}⋃
⋃{
(ti, qi) : T = min {α,T }, 0 ≤ qi ≤ (α − T )+
}
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ti
qi
T
α − T
0
Qi = qi + ti : constant
Dominant strategies
(a) T < α
qi
α
α
T0 ti
Qi = qi + ti : constant
Dominant strategies
(b) T ≥ α
Figure 1: Retailers strategy set S i.
Figure 1a depicts the set S i when T < α and Figure 1b when T ≥ α.
As shown below, Lemma 3.1 considerably simplifies the maximization of ui
(
·, s j
)
, since for any strategy s j
of retailer R j, the maximum of ui
(
·, s j
)
will be attained at the bottom or right-hand side boundary of the region
[0,min {α,T }]× [0, (α − T )+]. Moreover, Lemma 3.1 implies that when α ≤ T , retailer Ri will order no additional
quantity from the supplier4. Although trivial, we may not exclude this case in general, since in Section 4, we
consider α to be varying.
3.1 Unique second-stage equilibrium strategies
Restricting attention to S i for i = 1, 2, we obtain the best reply correspondences BR1 and BR2 of retailers R1
and R2, respectively. To proceed, we notice that the payoff of retailer Ri, i = 1, 2 depends on the total quantity Q j
that retailer R j, j = 3 − i releases to the market and not on the explicit values of t j, q j, cf. (3).
Lemma 3.2. The best reply correspondence BRi
(
Q j
)
= (ti, qi) of retailer Ri for i = 1, 2 is given by
BRi(Q j) =

(
T, α−w−Q j2 − T
)
, if 0 ≤ Q j < α − w − 2T (1)
(T, 0) , if α − w − 2T ≤ Q j < α − 2T (2)(
α−Q j
2 , 0
)
, if α − 2T ≤ Q j (3)
Proof. See A. Enumeration (1) , (2) , (3) of the different parts of the best reply correspondence will be used for a
more clear case discrimination in the subsequent equilibrium analysis. 
A generic graph of the best reply correspondence BR1 of retailer R1 to the total quantity Q2 that retailer R2
releases to the market is given in Figure 2. The equilibrium analysis of the second stage of the game proceeds
in the standard way, i.e., with the identification of Nash equilibria through the intersection of the best reply
correspondences BR1 and BR2. From the explicit form of the best reply correspondence that is given in Lemma 3.2
(see also Figure 2), it is straightforward that the equilibrium strategies depend on the values of α and w and their
relation to T1,T2. For convenience, we will denote with Γi j the case that the equilibrium occurs as an intersection
of parts i, j for i, j = 1, 2, 3. Since by assumption T1 ≥ T2, only the cases with i ≥ j (instead of all possible 9
cases) may occur.
Proposition 3.3. Given the values of α and w, the second-stage equilibrium strategies between retailers R1 and
R2 for all possible values of T1 ≥ T2 are given by
3Of course, this means that there is no randomness in α, so the description of α as a random variable is redundant in the complete
information case. We use it just to give a common formal description of both the complete and the incomplete information case.
4In Proposition 3.7 we will see that in equilibirum retailer Ri will order no additional quantity if α ≤ 3T .
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Q1
Q2
T α
2
− w
2
α − w − 2T
α − 2T
α
(1)
(2)
(3)
0
(t1, q1) =
(
T, α−w−Q22 − T
)
(t1, q1) = (T, 0)
(t1, q1) =
(
α−Q2
2 , 0
)
Figure 2: Best reply correspondence of Retailer R1.
Equilibrium Strategies
Case Range of α t∗1 q
∗
1 t
∗
2 q
∗
2
Γ11 (3T1 + w,∞) T1 α−w3 − T1 T2 α−w3 − T2
Γ21 (max {3T1 − w,T1 + 2T2 + w} , 3T1 + w] T1 0 T2 α−w−T12 − T2
Γ22 (2T1 + T2,T1 + 2T2 + w] T1 0 T2 0
Γ31 (3T2 + 2w, 3T1 − w] α+w3 0 T2 α−2w3 − T2
Γ32 (3T2,min {2T1 + T2, 3T2 + 2w}] α−T22 0 T2 0
Γ33 [0, 3T2] α3 0
α
3 0
Table 1: Second stage equilibrium strategies for all T1 ≥ T2.
The second-stage equilibria regions in the T1 − T2 plane are depicted in Figure 3. One should notice that the
conditions under which cases Γi j (second column of Table 1) apply are mutually exclusive, and hence, there exists
a unique second-stage equilibrium. In more detail, if T1 > T2, exactly one of the following two mutually exclusive
arrangements of the α-intervals will obtain: either (a) 0 < 3T2 < 2T1 +T2 < T1 +2T2 +w < 3T1 +w < ∞ with case
Γ31 empty or (b) 0 < 3T2 < 3T2 + 2w < 3T1 − w < 3T1 + w < ∞ with case Γ22 empty. If T1 = T2, then (a) obtains
and the α-intervals simplify to 0 < 3T < 3T + w < ∞. Also, the retailers’ equilibrium strategies are continuous at
the cutting points of the α-intervals, i.e., the “Range of α” intervals of Table 1 can be taken as left-hand side closed
also. Generically, in the T1 − T2 plane, the result of Proposition 3.3 is summarized in Figure 3. The boundaries of
the different regions in Figure 3 (or equivalently the conditions in Table 1) depend on the values of both w and α.
However, the point α3 on both the T1 and the T2 axes and the line α = 2T1 + T2 that separates the cases Γ22 and Γ32
depend only on the value of α and not on w. Thus, they will serve as a basis for case discrimination when solving
for the optimal strategy of the supplier in the first stage.
3.2 First-stage supplier’s equilibrium pricing strategy
Based on Figure 3 (or equivalently on Table 1) and using equation (5), we can calculate the payoff function,
us (r | α), of the supplier as α varies, when the retailers use their equilibrium strategies at the second stage. To
proceed, we denote with q∗i j (w) := q
∗
1 (w) + q
∗
2 (w) the total quantity that the retailers order from the supplier when
case Γi j for j ≤ i ∈ {1, 2, 3} occurs in the second stage. Then, we have the following
Lemma 3.4. Assuming that the retailers use their equilibrium strategies in the second stage, the supplier’s payoff
function is given by
us (r | α) = r ·

q∗31 (r + c) , 0 ≤ r ≤ min
{
1
2 (α − 2c − 3T2) , 3T1 − c − α
}
q∗21 (r + c) , max {0, |α − 3T1| − c} ≤ r ≤ α − c − T1 − 2T2
q∗11 (r + c) , 0 ≤ r < α − c − 3T1
0, else
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α
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α
3
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α
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3
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w
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0
Figure 3: Second stage equilibria regions in the T1 − T2 plane.
It is immediate that some cases may not occur for different values of the parameters. Hence, to derive the
optimal strategy r∗ of the supplier (see proof of Proposition 3.5), a further case discrimination is necessary. As we
have already noted, the relative position of α to the quantities 3T1, 3T2 and 2T1 + T2 will serve as a basis for case
discrimination. Maximizing the payoff function of the supplier for each case yields his optimal strategy r∗ (i.e.,
the profit margin that maximizes his profits given that the retailers will play their equilibrium strategies in the next
stage) for all possible values of α and T1,T2.
To simplify the expressions in the statement of Proposition 3.5, let D := T1 − T2, ∆ :=
√
3+3
2 D. It will be
convenient to distinguish two cases, depending on whether 0 < c ≤ D or 0 ≤ D < c. Also, as mentioned, the
second stage equilibrium quantities are continuous at the points at which their expression changes, and therefore,
we allow the subsequent cases to overlap on the cutting points.
Proposition 3.5. For given T1 ≥ T2, the supplier’s optimal pricing strategy r∗ for all possible values of α is
Case: r∗ (α) Conditions
Case A: – r∗ ∈ R+ 0 ≤ α ≤ 3T2 + 2c
0 < c ≤ D Γ31 : 14 (α − 2c − 3T2) 3T2 + 2c ≤ α ≤ 3T2 + ∆ −
√
3−1
2 c
Γ21 : 12 (α − c − T1 − 2T2) 3T2 + ∆ −
√
3−1
2 c ≤ α ≤ 3T2 + 2∆ + c
Γ11 : 12
(
α − c − 32 T1 − 32 T2
)
3T2 + 2∆ + c ≤ α
Case B: – r∗ ∈ R+ 0 ≤ α ≤ T1 + 2T2 + c
0 ≤ D < c Γ21 : 12 (α − c − T1 − 2T2) T1 + 2T2 + c ≤ α ≤ 3T2 + 2∆ + c
Γ11 : 12
(
α − c − 32 T1 − 32 T2
)
3T2 + 2∆ + c ≤ α
Table 2: First stage equilibrium strategies for all α ≥ 0.
Combining Propositions 3.3 and 3.5, one obtains the subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game under
complete information for the general case of asymmetric retailers and for all different values of α, c and T1 ≥ T2.
3.3 Higher demand does not imply a higher wholesale price
Although the supplier’s payoff function us (r | α) is continuous at the cutting points of the α-intervals, the
same is not true for the supplier’s optimal strategy as can be checked from Proposition 3.5. For given T1,T2 with
T1 ≥ T2, not only r∗ (α) is not continuous in α, but it is also not increasing in α (although it is increasing on each
sub-interval). At the points of discontinuity the supplier is indifferent between the left-hand side and right-hand
side strategies. However, any mixture of these strategies does not yield the same payoff since his payoff is not
linear in r∗. The reason for these discontinuities is that the supplier faces a piecewise linear demand instead of a
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linear demand. Therefore, at the cutting points there is a “jump” from the arg max of the first linear part to the
arg max of the other linear part, hence the discontinuity. This also explains the decrease of the optimal price as
we move from certain cutting points to the right, even if the increase in the demand intercept α is -small. Of
course, one can check that under his optimal strategy, not only the supplier’s payoff is continuous, but it is also an
increasing function of the demand α, as expected. Formally,
Corollary 3.6. The retailers’ equilibrium strategies and payoff functions are continuous in the demand level
α. While the supplier’s payoff is also continuous and increasing in α, his equilibrium pricing policy is neither
continuous nor monotonic in α.
3.4 The symmetric case: identical second-stage retailers
The equilibrium analysis considerably simplifies if we restrict attention to the case of identical retailers, i.e.,
T1 = T2 = T . In this case, only symmetric equilibria may occur in the second stage. The equilibrium strategies
depend on the value of α and its relative position to 3T . The proofs of Corollaries 3.7 and 3.8 follow immediately
from Propositions 3.3 and 3.5 and are omitted.
Corollary 3.7. If T1 = T2 = T, then for all values of α, the second stage equilibrium strategies between retailers
R1 and R2 are symmetric, and for i = 1, 2 they are given by s∗i (w) =
(
t∗i (w) , q
∗
i (w)
)
with t∗i (w) = T − 13 (3T − α)+,
and q∗i (w) =
1
3 (α − 3T − w)+.
The general form of the supplier’s payoff function us (r | α) is given by (5) and his strategy set by (4). Obvi-
ously, the supplier will not be willing to charge prices lower than his cost c. Based on the discussion of Corol-
lary 3.7 and the constraint w ≥ c (i.e., r ≥ 0), we conclude that a transaction will take place for values of α > 3T +c
and for r ∈ [0, α−3T −c). In that case, the optimal profit margin of the supplier is at the midpoint of the r-interval.
To see this, let q∗ (w) := q∗1 (w) + q
∗
2 (w) denote the total quantity that the supplier will receive as an order from
the retailers when they respond optimally. By Corollary 3.7, q∗(w) = 23 (α − 3T − w)+. Hence, on the equilibrium
path and for r ≥ 0, the payoff of the supplier is
us (r | α) = rq∗ (w) = 2
3
r (α − 3T − c − r)+ (7)
We then have
Corollary 3.8. For T1 = T2 = T and for all values of α, the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy r∗ (α) of the
supplier is given by r∗ (α) = 12 (α − 3T − c)+.
Corollary 3.8 implies that if α < 3T + c, then the optimal profit of the supplier is equal to 0, i.e., he will set
a price equal to his cost. Actually, he is indifferent between any price w ≥ c since in that case, he knows that the
retailers will order no additional quantity. In sum, Corollaries 3.7 and 3.8 provide the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the two-stage game in the case of identical (i.e., T1 = T2 = T ) retailers.
Theorem 3.9. If the capacities of the retailers are identical, i.e., if T1 = T2 = T, then the complete information
two-stage game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, under which the supplier sells with profit margin
r∗ (α) = 12 (α − 3T − c)+ and each of the retailers orders quantity q∗ (w) = 13 (α − 3T − w)+ and produces (releases
from his inventory) quantity t∗ (w) = T − 13 (3T − α)+.
3.5 Mitigating marginal cost effects: increased social welfare
Using the notation of Corollary 3.7, Q∗i = t
∗
i + q
∗
i is the total quantity of the good that each retailer releases to
the market in equilibrium. If α ≤ 3T , then Q∗i is equal to the equilibrium quantity of a classic Cournot duopolist
who faces linear inverse demand with intercept equal to α and has 0 cost per unit. If α > 3T , then the equilibrium
quantities of the retailers depend on the supplier’s price w. If w ≥ α − 3T , the retailers will avoid ordering and
will release their inventories to the market. Contrarily, if w is low enough, i.e., if w < α − 3T , they will be willing
to order additional quantities from the supplier. In this case, Q∗i = t
∗
i + q
∗
i = T +
1
3 (α − 3T − w) = 13 (α − w).
This quantity is equal to the equilibrium quantity of a Cournot duopolist who faces linear demand with intercept
α and cost per unit w for all product units, despite the fact that here, the retailers face a cost of 0 for the first T
units and w for the rest. Hence, in this case and as a result of marginal cost analysis, the market behaves as if
there were no inventories, and the most expensive units are the ones that determine the total quantity sold to the
market. However, if the market coordinates on the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, then as determined in
Theorem 3.9, the supplier’s optimal price, w∗ (α) = r∗ (α) + c = 12 (α − 3T − c)+ + c, depends negatively on T , i.e.,
it decreases as T increases.
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Based on these observations, the retailers’ low-cost in-house production (or low-cost inventory) affects in
different ways the total quantity that is released to the market and thus, it has both a direct and an indirect impact
on the consumers’ surplus5: for lower values of the demand parameter, the consumers benefit from the retailers’
low-cost inventories or production capacities since otherwise no goods would have been released to the market. For
higher values of α the total quantity that is released to the market depends indirectly on T – via a lower wholesale
price set by the supplier – and thus the benefits from the retailers’ integrated low-cost production channel are again
experienced by the consumers.
4 Subgame-perfect equilibrium under demand uncertainty
We now study the equilibrium behavior of the supply chain, assuming that the supplier has incomplete infor-
mation about the true value of the demand parameter α when he sets his price, while the retailers know it when
they place their orders (if any). In the two-stage game context, we assume that the demand is realized after the first
stage (i.e., after the supplier sets his price) but prior to the second stage of the game (i.e., prior to the decision of the
retailers about the quantity they will release to the market). The case T1 ≥ T2 exhibits significant computational
difficulties and we will restrict our attention to the symmetric case T1 = T2 = T .
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium analysis of the second stage (as presented in subsection 3.1) remains
unaffected: the retailers observe the actual demand parameter α and the price w set by the supplier and choose
the quantities ti and qi for i = 1, 2. However, in the first stage, the actual payoff of the supplier depends on the
unknown parameter α for which he has a belief: the distribution F of α, which induces a non-atomic measure on
[0,∞) with finite expectation, as assumed. Given the value of α and assuming that the retailers respond to the
supplier’s choice w with their unique equilibrium strategies, the supplier’s actual payoff is provided by equation
(7). Taking the expectation with respect to his belief (see also (6)) implies that when α is unknown and distributed
according to F, the payoff function of the supplier is equal to
us (r) =
2
3
r E (α − 3T − c − r)+ for r ≥ 0. (8)
Let rH := αH − 3T − c and rL := αL − 3T − c. If rH ≤ 0, then α ≤ 3T + c for all α, i.e., then, us (r) ≡ 0 and
the problem is trivial. Hence, to proceed, we assume that rH > 0 ⇔ 3T + c < αH . Then, since us (r) = 0 for
r ≥ rH , we may restrict the domain of us (r) and take it to be the interval [0, rH) in (8). To proceed, we observe
that us (r) may be expressed in terms of the Mean Residual Lifetime (MRL) function, which is defined as, see e.g.,
[Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007]] or [Belzunce et al. [2016]],
m (t) :=
E (α − t | α > t) =
∫ ∞
t
(1 − F (x)) dx
1 − F (t) if P (α > t) > 0
0 otherwise
(9)
The term MRL stems from the reliability and actuarial literature. In the present setting, the MRL function denotes
the expected additional demand. Despite being a powerful and well-studied tool to deal with uncertainty, the MRL
function has only scarce and informal applications in the revenue management literature or economics in general.
Using this representation, one may get the following6
Lemma 4.1. For r ∈ (0, rH), the supplier’s payoff function and its derivative are expressed through the MRL
function by us (r) = 23 rm (r + 3T + c) (1 − F (r + 3T + c)) and
dus
dr
(r) =
2
3
(m (r + 3T + c) − r) (1 − F (r + 3T + c)) , (10)
respectively. In addition, the roots of du
s
dr (r) in (0, rH) (if any) satisfy the fixed point equation r
∗ = m (r∗ + 3T + c).
Based on the first order conditions stated in Lemma 4.1, we are now able to derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for Bayesian Nash equilibria). Under incomplete information
with identical retailers (i.e., for T1 = T2 = T) for the non-trivial case rH > 0 and assuming the supplier’s belief
induces a non-atomic measure on the demand parameter space:
5We remind that the consumers’ surplus is proportional to the square of the total quantity that is released to the market.
6It should be stressed that obtaining (10) is not straightforward at all, because the product rule of differentiation does not apply. In particular,
see Lemma A.1 and the proof of Lemma 4.1, all in the Appendix.
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A. (necessary condition) If the optimal profit margin r∗ of the supplier exists when the retailers follow their
equilibrium strategies in the second stage, then it satisfies the fixed point equation
r∗ = m (r∗ + 3T + c) (11)
B. (sufficient condition) If the mean residual lifetime m (·) of the demand parameter α is decreasing, then the
optimal profit margin r∗ of the supplier exists under equilibrium, and it is the unique solution of the equation r∗ =
m (r∗ + 3T + c). In that case, if E (α)−αL ≤ αL−3T−c (= rL), then r∗ is given explicitly by r∗ = 12 (E (α) − 3T − c).
Otherwise r∗ ∈
(
r+L , rH
)
.
Corollary 3.7 and Theorem 4.2 lead to
Corollary 4.3. If the capacities of the producers (retailers) are identical, i.e., if T1 = T2 = T, and if the distri-
bution F of the demand intercept α is of decreasing mean residual lifetime m (·), then the incomplete information
two-stage game has a unique subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the non-trivial case rH > 0. At
equilibrium, the supplier sells with profit margin r∗, which is the unique solution of the fixed point equation
r∗ = m (r∗ + 3T + c), and each of the producers (retailers) orders quantity q∗ (w) = 13 (α − 3T − w)+ and produces
(releases from his inventory) quantity t∗ (w) = T − 13 (3T − α)+.
By the DMRL property, Theorem 4.2 implies that r∗ ≤ E (α), since
r∗ = m (r∗ + 3T + c) ≤ m (u) ≤ m (0) = E (α) , (12)
for all u such that 0 ≤ u ≤ r∗ + 3T + c. Finally, if T = 0, then our model corresponds to a classic Cournot duopoly
at which the retailers’ cost equals the price that is set by a single revenue-maximizing supplier. As shown in our
related study, [Leonardos and Melolidakis [2017]], in this case, the milder condition of decreasing generalized
mean residual life (GMRL) is sufficient to yield existence and uniqueness of Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
5 Why the supplier may charge a high price
Utilizing the characterization of the supplier’s optimal price in Theorem 4.2, we compare the complete and
incomplete information equilibrium outcomes. It is well known that markets with incomplete information may be
inefficient at equilibrium in that trades that would be beneficial for all players may not occur under Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, e.g., see [Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983]]. Namely, under equilibrium, there exist values of α for
which a transaction would have occurred in the complete information case but not in the incomplete information
case. In such a case, the market will experience a stockout due to lack of coordination between the supplier and
the retailers. We call this phenomenon, an incoordination stockout.
5.1 Measuring market inefficiency
For the incomplete information case and for a particular distribution F of α, let U be the event that a transaction
would have occurred under equilibrium if we had been in the complete information case, and let V be the event
that a transaction does not occur in the incomplete information case under equilibrium. Our aim is to measure the
inefficiency of our market by studying P (V ∩ U) and P (V | U). By Corollary 3.7, a transaction will take place
under equilibrium if and only if
α > r∗ + 3T + c (13)
where r∗ stands for the profit margin of the supplier in the incomplete information case under equilibrium. Using
(13) and Corollary 3.8, a necessary and sufficient condition for a transaction to take place under equilibrium
in the complete information case is α > 3T + c. Using Theorem 4.2 and the steps at the end of its proof, it
is straightforward to check that if E (α) − αL ≤ rL, then (13) is satisfied for all α > αL since the ordering is
3T + c < r∗ + 3T + c ≤ αL. Hence V ∩ U = ∅. So let us assume that E (α) − αL > rL. We then have
Lemma 5.1. For a given distribution F of α with the DMRL property, let V be the event that a transaction does
not occur in the incomplete information case under equilibrium and let U be the event that a transaction would
have occurred under equilibrium if we had been in the complete information case. Then
P (V | U) = F (r
∗ + 3T + c) − F (3T + c)
1 − F (3T + c)
In particular, if E (α) − αL ≤ αL − 3T − c (= rL), then P (V ∩ U) = P (V | U) = 0.
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As in the case when T = 0 (see [Leonardos and Melolidakis [2017]]) the next Theorem shows that P (V | U)
admits a bound which is independent of F.
Theorem 5.2. For any distribution F of α with the DMRL property, the probabilitiy of an incoordination stockout,
i.e. the conditional probability P (V | U) that a transaction does not occur under equilibrium in the incomplete
information case, given that a transaction would have occurred under equilibrium if we had been in the complete
information case, cannot exceed the bound 1 − e−1, i.e.,
P (V | U) ≤ 1 − e−1 (14)
This bound is tight over all DMRL distributions, because it is attained by the exponential distribution.
5.2 Risk of an incoordination stockout
To gain more intuition about the reasons that make the supplier charge a price that runs a (sometimes) con-
siderable risk of no transaction, although such a transaction would be beneficial for all market participants, recall
the discussion preceding Lemma 5.1. To have P (V | U) = 0, the expectation restriction, E(a) ≤ αL + rL, must
apply. So, assuming this restriction applies and keeping everything else the same (i.e., αL, T and c), start moving
probability mass to the right. Then, E (α) will be increasing which results in the supplier’s optimal profit mar-
gin, r∗ = 12 (E (α) − 3T − c), increasing. Thus, there is a threshold for E (α), namely αL + rL (when the supplier
charges r∗ = rL), above which the supplier is willing to charge a price so high (i.e., above rL) that he will run the
risk of receiving no orders. Notice, that this discussion implies neither monotonicity of the supplier’s payoff nor
monotonicity of the probability of no transaction.
Next, assume that the expectation restriction applies and keeping T and c the same, start moving αL to the
left. Now, E (α) will be decreasing, which results in the supplier’s optimal profit margin, r∗, decreasing. However,
since rL will eventually become non-positive while E (α) − αL always stays positive, it is easy to see that again,
the same threshold applies for the expectation condition, i.e., eventually we will get E (α) = αL + rL, the supplier
will charge r∗ = rL there, and for lower values of αL inefficiencies will appear. In other words, for values of αL
below the threshold, although he is reducing his profit margin, the supplier is asking for a relatively high price
(i.e., above rL) and is willing to take the risk of no transactions. Finally, using similar arguments, we can see that
if we either increase the inventory level T of the retailers or the cost c of the supplier, all else being kept the same
(see also Corollaries 6.1 and 6.2), the same threshold applies for the appearance of inefficiencies, determined by
E (α) = αL + rL.
5.3 Numerical simulations
In the simulations presented below, we examine the probability of no transaction, as determined in Lemma 5.1
and the supplier’s expected payoff against the expected demand (mean of demand parameter α). First, we simulate
the uniform distribution α ∼ U[αL, αH], i.e., f (α) = 1αH−αL · 1α∈[αL,αH ] with αL = 100 and αH = 100 + 5 · j for
j = 1, . . . , 100, cost c = 1 and inventories T = 20. The results are shown in Figure 4 below. The x−axis represents
the mean Eα of the respective distribution of α. Observe that the probability of no transaction becomes positive for
Eα > 139 (= αL + rL). The supplier’s expected payoff is strictly positive for all j ≥ 1 and moreover, it increases
despite an increasing probability of no transaction. The same behavior is exhibited by the (shifted) exponential
Figure 4: No transaction probability and expected supplier’s payoff as the expected demand increases.
distribution. In Figure 5, we see the simulation results for α ∼ 100 + exp (λ), i.e., f (α) = 1
λ
e−
1
λ
(x−100) for x ≥ 100,
with λ = 10 · j for j = 1, . . . 50. As above, T = 20 and c = 1 which implies that the threshold for the appearance
of inefficiencies, remains the same, i.e., Eα > 139 (= αL + rL). In the left figure, we observe that the probability
of no transaction attains the upper bound that is determined in Theorem 5.2. Having a constant MRL, the shifted-
exponential distribution is DMRL, which shows that this bound is tight over the class of DMRL distributions.
Again, the supplier’s expected payoff – right figure – is strictly positive for all j ≥ 1 and increasing.
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Figure 5: Exponential distribution: α ∼ 100 + exp (λ).
5.4 Lower expected demand but higher wholesale price
The next simulation, shows that a higher expected demand does not necessarily imply a higher wholesale
price. To see this, we compare two gamma distributions α1 and α2 for the market demand, with parameters
α1 ∼ 100 + Γ (10, 2) and α2 ∼ 100 + Γ (2, 9). We say that α ∼ Γ (k, θ) if α has probability density function
f (r | k, θ) = 1
Γ(k)θk r
k−1e−
r
θ . Here, T = 33 and c = 1. The figure on the left, shows that α1 and α1 are incomparable
Figure 6: Gamma distributions: α1 ∼ Γ (10, 2) and α2 ∼ Γ (2, 9).
in the usual stochastic order. The figure on the right shows the MRL functions m1 (r) of α1, m2 (r) of α2 and the
diagonal y = r. The intersection points are precisely the optimal wholesale prices for each distribution. Here
r∗1 = 10.21 and r
∗
2 = 12.73, despite the fact that Eα1 = 20 > 18 = Eα2. The supplier’s expected payoff is higher in
the first market than in the second, since us(r∗1) = 100.5 > 95.1 = u
s(r∗2).
The observation that larger markets (in terms of expectation) do not necessarily give rise to higher prices
confirms the intuition of [Lariviere and Porteus [2001]] that ”size is not everything” and that price movements are
driven by different forces. In our case the explanation is provided by (11): to obtain a higher price one needs to
compare two markets in terms of the mrl-order (see [Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007]]) and not in terms of their
means or of the usual stochastic order. Here, α2 eventually dominates α1 in terms of their mrl functions and hence
the market that is described by α2 results in a higher wholesale price.
6 Effect of cost and inventory size on the supplier’s profit margin and
pricing policy
The characterization result of Theorem 4.2 facilitates the comparative statics analysis on the parameters that
determine the supplier’s pricing policy. Under the DMRL assumption, if everything else stays the same but
retailers’ inventories are rising (but staying below (αH−c)/3 because of the non-triviality assumption), the supplier
will strictly decrease or keep constant the price he charges at equilibrium, because his profit margin r∗ will be non-
increasing. The reason is that as T increases, the graph of m ( · ,T, c) := m ( · + 3T + c) shifts to the left, and
therefore, its intercept with the line bisecting the first quadrant decreases7. By Theorem 4.2, this intercept is r∗,
and hence the price w∗ = c + r∗ the supplier asks at equilibrium will be decreasing. Hence,
Corollary 6.1. Under the DMRL property, if everything else stays the same and the retailers’ inventory capacity
T increases in the interval [0, (αH − c) /3), then at equilibrium, the supplier’s profit margin r∗, and hence the
wholesale price w∗ = r∗ + c, both decrease.
7To avoid confusion, we use the terms “decreases” in the sense “decreases non-strictly” or “does not increase”, as we did before.
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The result of Corollary 6.1 is illustrated in Figure 7 for exponentially distributed demand with mean λ = 10.
The supplier’s cost is constant and equal to c = 1, and the retailers’ inventory is equal to T = j, with j taking
values in j = 1, 2, . . . , 30.
Figure 7: Basic model quantities as retailer’s inventory increases.
By the same argument, if we take the supplier’s cost c to be increasing (but staying below αH − 3T ) while
everything else stays fixed, then the supplier’s profit margin r∗ will again be decreasing. However, this time,
the price w∗ = c + r∗ the supplier asks at equilibrium will be increasing. To see this, let c1 < c2. Then, since
m (·) is decreasing, r∗2 ≤ r∗1. If r∗2 = r∗1, then w∗1 = r∗1 + c1 < r∗2 + c2 = w∗2. If r∗2 < r∗1, by Theorem 4.2,
m(r∗2 + 3T + c2) < m(r
∗
1 + 3T + c1). The DMRL property then implies that r
∗
1 + c1 ≤ r∗2 + c2, i.e., w∗2 ≥ w∗1. So, in
this case, we have
Corollary 6.2. Under the DMRL property, if everything else stays the same and the supplier’s cost c increases in
the interval [0, αH − 3T ), then at equilibrium, the supplier’s profit margin r∗ decreases while the wholesale price
w∗ = r∗ + c increases.
The result of Corollary 6.2 is presented graphically below. Let α ∼ 100 + 100 · Beta (1, 2), i.e., the demand
parameter α follows a scaled Beta distribution on the interval [αL, αH] = [100, 200] and let T = 40. The x−axis
corresponds to values for the cost parameter c in the range c = 1, 2, . . . , 30. As predicted by Corollary 6.2, the
Figure 8: Basic model quantities as supplier’s cost increases (scaled Beta demand)
wholesale price that the supplier charges increases, whereas his profit margin decreases. The total order quantity
(quantity ordered by both retailers) decreases and since the inventory parameter T is kept constant, this results in
a decrease in consumers’ surplus. A similar behavior of these quantities is observed when α ∼ 100 + exp (λ = 10),
i.e., when α follows a shifted exponential distribution with mean λ = 10 and T = 40. For completeness, the results
of the simulation are shown in Figure 9 below Further simulations with uniformly and Pareto distributed demand
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Figure 9: Basic model quantities as supplier’s cost increases (exponential demand)
– which does not satisfy the DMRL property – and for a wide range of their parameters essentially highlight the
same qualitative behavior for these quantities (wholesale price, profit margin, supplier’s payoff and total order
quantities) and thus, are omitted.
7 Number of second-stage retailers and supplier’s profits
Theorem 4.2, the main result of Section 4, admits a straightforward extension to the case of n > 2 identical
retailers, i.e., n retailers each having capacity constraint Ti = T . Formally, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2 and
denote with Ri retailer i, for i ∈ N. As in Section 2, a strategy profile is denoted with s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn). The
payoff function of Ri depends on the total quantity of the remaining n − 1 retailers and is given by (3), where now
Q denotes the total quantity sold by all n retailers, i.e.,
Q =
n∑
j=1
Q j =
n∑
j=1
(t j + q j)
Following common notation, let s = (s−i, si) and Q−i = Q−Qi for i ∈ N. It is immediately evident that Lemma 3.1
and Lemma 3.2 still apply, if one replaces Q j with Q−i and s j with s−i. Hence, one may generalize Proposition 3.7
as follows
Proposition 7.1. If Ti = T for i ∈ N, then for all values of α the strategies s∗i (w) =
(
t∗i (w) , q
∗
i (w)
)
, or shortly
s∗i =
(
t∗i , q
∗
i
)
, with t∗i (w) = T − 1n+1 ((n + 1) T − α)+, and q∗i (w) = 1n+1 (α − (n + 1) T − w)+, are second-stage
equilibrium strategies among the retailers Ri, for i ∈ N.
Turning attention to the first stage, the payoff function of the supplier in the complete information case (cf.
Subsection 3.2) will be given by us (r) = rq∗ (w) = nn+1 r (α − (n + 1) T − c − r)+, and hence, it is maximized
at r∗ (α) = 12 (α − (n + 1) T − c)+, which generalizes Proposition 3.8. Similarly, if the supplier knows only the
distribution and not the true value of α, the arguments of Section 4 still apply. Then the payoff function of the
supplier - cf. (8) - becomes us (r) = nn+1 r E (α − (n + 1) T − c − r)+, for r ≥ 0 and hence
us (r) =
n
n + 1
r m (r + (n + 1) T + c) (1 − F (r + (n + 1) T + c)) ,
for 0 ≤ r < αH − (n + 1) T − c. Proceeding as in Subsection 3.2, we can generalize Theorem 4.2 to the case of
n ≥ 2 identical retailers. To this end, let r nL := αL − (n + 1) T − c and r nH := αH − (n + 1) T − c. Then,
Theorem 7.2 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for Bayesian Nash equilibria). Under incomplete information,
for identical retailers (i.e., for Ti = T, i ∈ N) for the non-trivial case r nH > 0 and assuming the supplier’s belief
induces a non-atomic measure on the demand parameter space:
A. (necessary condition) If the optimal profit margin r∗ of the supplier exists when the retailers follow their
equilibrium strategies in the second stage, then it satisfies the fixed point equation
r∗ = m (r∗ + (n + 1) T + c)
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B. (sufficient condition) If the mean residual lifetime m (·) of the demand parameter α is decreasing, then the
optimal profit margin r∗ of the supplier exists under equilibrium, and it is the unique solution of the equation
r∗ = m (r∗ + (n + 1) T + c). In that case, if E (α) − αL ≤ αL − (n + 1) T − c
(
= r nL
)
, then r∗ is given explicitly by
r∗ = 12 (E (α) − (n + 1) T − c). Otherwise, r∗ ∈
((
r nL
)+
, r nH
)
.
7.1 Increased competition may benefit the supplier
Based on Theorem 7.2, we study how the number of second-stage retailers affects supplier’s profit and con-
sumers’ surplus, the latter as expressed by the total quantity that is sold in the market. In Figure 10, we present
the results from simulating the distribution of α as the uniform distribution on the interval [αL, αH] = [100, 300],
with c = 1 and T = 5 (T represents the quantity produced by each of the n identical retailers). For values of
Figure 10: Basic model quantities for increasing number of second-stage retailers.
n ≤ 5, the supplier benefits from increasing second-stage competition both in terms of quantity ordered and in
terms of his overall payoff. However, as the number of retailers further increases – and hence the total quantity
produced (or held as inventory) also increases – the supplier receives less total orders and his payoff declines. On
the other hand, the total quantity that is released to the market increases as the number of retailers increases. Under
our assumptions, each additional retailer has access to a constant amount of T low-cost in-house produced units.
This leads to a lower profit margin for the supplier and a lower overall cost for the retailers that, in turn, leads to
the observed increase of the total quantity that is sold to the consumers. Hence, in the present setting, increased
second-stage competition positively contributes to the total consumer surplus.
The behavior exhibited in Figure 10 seems typical – based on several simulations that are omitted for brevity
– for a wide range of parameters and distributions that may (Beta, exponential) or may not (Generalized Pareto)
satisfy the DMRL condition.
8 Discussion & future work
From a game-theoretic perspective, the current model aims to capture and study the complex cost structure of
contemporary Cournot oligopolists through a mathematical model that is realistic, but also tractable. The deriva-
tion of the market equilibrium under different information levels and the analytical representation of the equilib-
rium strategies of the interacting entities, supplier and retailers, provide the proper framework for an extensive
sensitivity analysis of the model parameters.
From an economic perspective, the model assumptions and the setup that is employed aim to reflect situations
from the real economic practice and thus, to have an impact on policy development and implementation by active
economic stakeholders. To this end, we further elaborate on the model assumptions and discuss directions for
further research.
Single supplier: The monopoly setting that we employ in the present paper allows for a transparent study on
the pricing decisions of a firm. Similar models, with a single supplier and multiple retailers have been extensively
studied in the relevant literature, see e.g., [Tyagi [1999], Bernstein and Federgruen [2005], Yang and Zhou [2006]]
and [Wu et al. [2012]] among others. The absence of upstream competition in these models is a simplifying factor
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that concentrates the analysis on the impact of the supplier’s decisions to the retail market. Our study considers
the additional assumptions of in-house production capacities and demand uncertainty and aims to contribute in
this stream of literature.
The study of such models is also theoretically justified. While one may think, monopolies are rare in the
contemporary congested economies, a more detailed reflection suggests the opposite. For instance, oligopolistic
firms differentiate their products in such a degree that they monopolize specific market niches. Moreover, brand
loyalty, increasing market protection, government policies, diversification and technology integration are only
some of the prevalent economic factors that still lead to the formation of monopolies. Hence, monopoly pricing
remains relevant and continues to attract research attention, see e.g., [Chen and Frank [2004]].
Despite these arguments, it is self-evident from an economic perspective that upstream competition should be
considered as an extension of the present model in future studies. This research direction will primarily investi-
gate the suppliers’ strategies to avoid straightforward price competition and hence, the trivial Bertrand equilibrium
according to which they will sell at their marginal cost. Such an approach involves the study of product differen-
tiation, favourable buy-back conditions and other more involved research & development (R&D) and marketing
policies and as a result shifts the point of interest from pricing to strategic planning. The insights obtained by the
present work can serve as a benchmark for comparison in such a study.
Uniform pricing: We study a setting in which the supplier has ample quantities to cover any possible demand
by the retailers (domestic manufacturers). The retailers only refer to the supplier if they exhaust their own pro-
duction capacities and order quantities that are not comparable in size to the supplier’s capacity (big international
manufacturer). This model aims to capture the prevalent economic practice, where domestic manufacturers hedge
their risks that are associated with demand fluctuations by reverting to the international spot markets of the same
product in cases of a stockout. Yet, price discrimination is an interesting and direct extension of the present study.
Price differentiation has been thoroughly studied as a mechanism to increase supply chain coordination and profits
and recent studies corroborate the position that price differentiation can benefit the social welfare as well, see e.g.,
[Wu and Zhou [2018]].
However, there are certain arguments that still motivate the study of the uniform-price setting as employed
in this paper. In addition to the fact, that price discrimination is prohibited by law in certain markets (see e.g.,
Robinson – Patman Act), there are structural properties of contemporary markets that make the study of supply
chains without price differentiation interesting, see e.g. [Hu et al. [2013]]. Two notable instances are internet
platforms and internationally operating suppliers as mentioned above. Manufacturers from domestic markets
turn to such markets to procure additional quantities in the case that the short-term demand exceeds their own
production capacities. This is done in an ad-hoc fashion (spot market) without significant prior communication
between the manufacturer and the global (or internet operating) supplier and in particular, without the opportunity
to develop a more elaborate transaction scheme (contract) between them. In essence, the globally operating
supplier may ignore several characteristics of the market that he is procuring, such as the level of demand or the
number of domestic retailers/manufacturers that operate in this local market. Finally, it is worth mentioning that
recent advances provide evidence that uniform pricing is more profitable for the supplier than price discrimination
for particular market structures, see [Matteucci and Reverberi [2018]].
Price-only contracts: Price-only contracts are still studied in the literature for two interconnected reasons: the
first is their simplicity (in terms of implementation) and the second their relevance to the real economic practice,
see e.g., [Lariviere and Porteus [2001]] or [Perakis and Roels [2007]]. More complex contracts often are costly
or hard to implement and hence, the classic price-only contract still prevails in many vertical markets. However,
there is also a third reason that makes the study of price-only contracts interesting in the particular setting of
demand uncertainty. The supplier and the retailers may well develop more complex contracts that indeed mitigate
demand uncertainty and supply chain risks. Yet, under the majority of the approaches that have been proposed and
studied in the relevant literature (such as dynamic pricing, buy-back contracts etc.), a certain degree of uncertainty
remains unaccounted for. This remaining uncertainty cannot be dealt with and is precisely captured by the price-
only contract. In this direction, [Li and Petruzzi [2017]] show that uncertainty reduction may even be undesirable
(harmful) for the involved parties and argue in favor of the use of price-only contracts.
Commitment on prices: Invariably, in most settings, strategic decisions concerning production capacities
are more binding than decisions concerning prices. This explains the extensive literature on models with capac-
ity or quantity (instead of price) pre-commitment. However, while customary and intuitive to assume flexible
prices, contemporary research suggests that the opposite may be true as well, see e.g., [Klenow and Malin [2010],
Goldberg and Hellerstein [2011], Nakamura and Steinsson [2013]] (and references cited therein). In fact, price
rigidity or equivalently price stickiness is an economic phenomenon that is evinced in the real economic practice to
a much larger extent than intuition would suggest, see [Kleshchelski and Vincent [2009]] and [Dhyne et al. [2009]]
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among others. In addition, in a short term, one-period analysis, as the one that is conducted in the present paper,
it is theoretically justified to assume constant prices.
Recent results provide a further argument in favor of price commitment by showing that wholesale price
commitment can be beneficial in its own right and thus may be employed by the supplier even in the presence
of price flexibility. As [Wu et al. [2012]] note in their literature review, early wholesale price commitment is
valuable for realizing downstream operational decisions before the investment is made, [Gilbert and Cvsa [2003]],
coordinating supply chain performance, [Desai et al. [2004]], or deterring the retailer from introducing a store
brand, [Groznik and Heese [2010]].
Finally, changing or adjusting an unreasonable price is certainly possible in a multiple-period dynamic setting
which can be thought of as a reasonable and interesting extension of the present one-period setting in which prices
remain constant. Indeed, it would be relevant both from a theoretical and a practical perspective to adjust the
present model to account for demand uncertainty that is distributed over multiple periods.
8.1 Future work
While the influence of the main model parameters has been thoroughly examined, there are still many di-
rections for more exhaustive comparative statics. From a technical perspective, affinity of the inverse demand
function may not be dropped if one still wants to express the supplier’s payoff in terms of the MRL function.
Hence, a generalization to models with non-affine inverse demand function is open. Finally, because the economic
practice provides a huge variety of market structures, the extensions of the present model can be thought of in
numerous ways. One immediate direction is the strategic determination of the production capacities T (or Ti if
the retailers are asymmetric), which are assumed to be given exogenously (i.e., to be pre-specified) in the present
model. Because production capacities are usually more rigid than prices, this should be done in a stage prior to the
pricing decision of the supplier. Challenging the basic model assumptions – e.g., that supplier’s cost is higher than
in-house production cost – to account for different market structures, while retaining the basic analytical results of
the present analysis (equilibrium strategies characterization) is another possible extension.
9 Conclusions
To study the strategic formation of the competing firms’ cost in a modern Cournot oligopoly, we extended
the classic model to a two-stage game. Oligopolists may produce limited capacities of a homogeneous good and
refer to an external supplier for additional procurements. The supplier can cover any demand but sets a price
prior to the retailers’ orders without necessarily knowing the exact market parameters (retail demand). When
the supplier is completely informed about the market demand, we derived the unique retailers’ and supplier’s
equilibrium strategies as functions of the capacity levels, the demand value and the supplier’s production cost.
While equilibrium strategies, payoffs of the retailers, and equilibrium payoff of the supplier are continuous and
increasing in the demand level α, the supplier’s optimal pricing strategy may not be continuous and not even
monotonic in α. When the supplier is not informed of the retail demand, his belief is modeled by a continuous
probability distribution function of the demand parameter. Under the mild assumption that the mean residual
expectation of his belief about the actual demand is decreasing (DMRL property), we established existence and
uniqueness of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Additionally, we characterized the supplier’s optimal price as a fixed
point of a translation of the MRL function, which enabled a tractable comparative statics and sensitivity analysis.
A comparison of the complete and incomplete information equilibrium outcomes in Section 5 indicated that
under the supplier’s optimal pricing policy, there is a considerable risk of no transaction between the supplier
and the retailers, although such a transaction would have been beneficial for everyone. In that case, a reduced
quantity will eventually be released to the consumers. Intuition on the reasons that lead the supplier to ask such
a high price is gained through analytical and numerical considerations. If the retailers’ production (or inventory)
capacity increases, then (at equilibrium) the supplier’s profit margin and wholesale price both decrease. If the
supplier’s cost increases, then his profit margin decreases, but the wholesale price that he asks increases. In this
case, the retailers’ orders to the supplier and hence the quantity sold to the consumers, both decrease. Finally,
under the assumption that the retailers are symmetric, i.e., each retailer has production capacity T , we determined
the market equilibrium for any number n of them. Based on this extension, we studied the impact of an increasing
number of retailers on the supplier’s profit for various distributions.
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A Appendix: General statements and proofs
A.1 Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.2. For convenience in notation we will give the proof for i = 1 and j = 2 which results in no
loss of generality due to symmetry of the retailers. Let w ≥ c and s2 = (t2, q2) ∈ S 2 with Q2 = t2 + q2. Restricting
ourselves firstly to strategies with q1 = 0, we have that
u1 ((t1, 0) , s2) = t1 (α − Q2 − t1)
Let t∗1 = arg max0≤t1≤T u
1 ((t1, 0) , s2). Since α−Qi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, we have that if α− 2T ≤ Q2, then t∗1 = 12 (α − Q2)
while if α − 2T > Q2, then the maximum of u1 ((t1, 0) , s2) is attained at the highest admissible (due to the
production capacity constraint) value of t1 and hence t∗1 = T . Similarly, for strategies with t1 = T and q1 > 0 we
have that the payoff function of retailer R1
u1 ((T, q1) , s2) = Q1 (α − w − Q2 − Q1) + Tw
= T (α − Q2 − T ) + q1 (α − w − 2T − Q2 − q1)
is maximized at q∗1 =
1
2
(α − w − 2T − Q2) under the constraint that q∗1 > 0 or equivalently Q2 < α − w − 2T . If
instead q∗1 ≤ 0, then the maximum of u1 ((T, q1) , s2) is attained at the lowest admissible value of q1 i.e. q1 = 0.
Since conditions α − 2T ≤ Q2 and Q2 < α − w − 2T cannot apply at the same time, the result obtains. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The proof proceeds by examining under what conditions a second stage equilibrium
occurs as an intersection of parts i, j = (1), (2), (3) of the best reply correspondences of the retailers.
Case Γ11. In this case the best reply correspondences intersect in their parts denoted by (1). By rearranging part
(1) of the best reply correspondence in Lemma 3.2 and assuming that Ri replies optimally to R j for i, j = 1, 2,
we obtain that the total quantities released to the market under equilibrium will be given by Q∗1 = Q
∗
2 =
α−w
3
subject to the constraints Q∗2 < α − w − 2T1 and Q∗1 < α − w − 2T2. Substituting the values Q∗1 and Q∗2 in the
constraints we find that these solutions are acceptable if α−w3 < α−w− 2T1 and α−w3 < α−w− 2T2 or equivalently
if max {T1,T2} < α−w3 which may be reduced to T1 <
α − w
3
since T2 ≤ T1 is assumed. Combining the above
relations and decomposing Q∗i as in Lemma 3.2 we obtain the first line of Table 1 that settles case Γ11. Similarly,
Case Γ21. Now, Q∗1 = T1 and Q
∗
2 =
α−w−T1
2 subject to α − w − 2T1 ≤ α−w−T12 < α − 2T1 and 0 ≤ T1 < α − w − 2T2.
Solving the constraints, yields max {T1 + T2 + w, 3T1 − w} < α ≤ 3T1 + w.
Case Γ22. Now, Q∗i = Ti, for i = 1, 2. These strategies are acceptable if α − w − 2T1 ≤ T2 < α − 2T1 and
α − w − 2T2 ≤ T1 < α − 2T2 which gives 2T1 + T2 < α ≤ T1 + 2T2 + w.
Case Γ31. Now, Q∗1 =
α−Q∗2
2 and Q
∗
2 =
α−w−Q∗1
2 . Hence, Q
∗
1 =
α+w
3 and Q
∗
2 =
α−2w
3 subject to α − 2T1 ≤ α−2w3 and
0 ≤ α+w3 < α − w − 2T2 or equivalently 3T2 + 2w < α ≤ 3T1 − w.
Case Γ32. It is easy to see that Q∗1 =
α−T2
2 and Q
∗
2 = T2 subject to α− 2T1 ≤ T2 and α−w− 2T2 ≤ α−T22 < α− 2T2,
which yields 3T2 < α ≤ 3T2 + 2w. Finally,
Case Γ33. Q∗1 = Q
∗
2 =
α
3 subject to α − 2T1 ≤ α3 and α − 2T2 ≤ α3 or equivalently α ≤ 3T2. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. By Table 1
q∗31 (w) =
1
3
(α − 2w − 3T2) , if 3T2 + 2w < α ≤ 3T1 − w
q∗21 (w) =
1
2
(α − w − T1 − 2T2) , if max {3T1 − w,T1 + 2T2 + w} < α ≤ 3T1 + w
q∗11 (w) =
2
3
(
α − w − 3
2
T1 − 32T2
)
, if 3T1 + w < α
q∗i j (w) = 0, else
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and since w = r + c, with c > 0 being a constant and r ≥ 0 being the strategic variable, the payoff function of the
supplier may be written as
us (r | α) = r ·

q∗31 (r + c) , 3T2 + 2c + 2r < α ≤ 3T1 − c − r
q∗21 (r + c) , max {3T1 − c − r,T1 + 2T2 + c + r} < α ≤ 3T1 + c + r
q∗11 (r + c) , 3T1 + c + r < α
0, else
for r ≥ 0, assuming that a subgame perfect equilibrium is played in the second stage. Re-arranging the conditions
in the last column and taking into account the continuity of us (r | α) at the cutting points of the α-intervals and
the non-negativity constraint for r, the claim follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5. The optimal values r∗ are denoted by r∗i j, j ≤ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, according to the equilibrium
that is played in the second stage.
Case A. Let 0 < c ≤ D. Then, 3T2 + 2c ≤ T1 + 2T2 + c ≤ 2T1 + T2 ≤ 3T1 − c ≤ 3T1 + c and hence for the different
values of α we have
A1. 0 ≤ α ≤ 3T2 + 2c. For all r ∈ R+ we have that us (r | α) ≡ 0 and hence r∗ = r ∈ R+.
A2. 3T2 + 2c ≤ α ≤ 2T1 + T2. The supplier’s payoff function is given by
us (r | α) = r ·
q∗31 (r + c) , 0 ≤ r ≤ 12 (α − 2c − 3T2)0, else
and hence, as a quadratic polynomial in r, it’s first part is maximized at r∗ = r∗31.
A3. 2T1 + T2 ≤ α ≤ 3T1 − c. Now
us (r | α) = r ·

q∗31 (r + c) , 0 ≤ r ≤ 3T1 − c − α
q∗21 (r + c) , 3T1 − c − α ≤ r ≤ α − c − T1 − 2T2
0, else
As quadratic polynomials in r, the first part is maximized at r∗31 and the second at r
∗
21. It is easy to see that
0 ≤ r∗31 ≤ r∗21 ≤ α − c − T1 − 2T2. Hence, in order to determine the maximum of us (r | α) with respect to r we
distinguish three sub-cases. Let S := T1 + T2, then
A3.1. 0 ≤ r∗31 ≤ r∗21 ≤ 3T1 − c − α. Then the overall maximum of us (r | α) is attained at r∗31. The inequality
r∗21 ≤ 3T1 − c − α holds iff 12 (α − c − T1 − 2T2) ≤ 3T1 − c − α⇔ α ≤ 32 S + 56 D − 13 c.
A3.2. 3T1 − c − α ≤ r∗31 ≤ r∗21. Then the overall maximum of us (r | α) is attained at r∗21. The inequality
3T1 − c − α ≤ r∗31 holds iff 3T1 − c − α ≤ 14 (α − 2c − 3T2)⇔ α ≥ 32 S + 910 D − 25 c.
A3.3. 0 ≤ r∗31 ≤ 3T1 − c − α ≤ r∗21. In this case we need to compare the payoffs us
(
r∗31 | α
)
and us
(
r∗21 | α
)
.
The overall maximum is attained at r∗31 iff u
s
(
r∗21 | α
)
≤ us
(
r∗31 | α
)
⇔ 18 (α − c − T1 − 2T2)2 ≤ 124 (α − 2c − 3T2)2.
Both terms (α − c − T1 − 2T2) and (α − 2c − 3T2) are non-negative since α ≥ 2T1 + T2 and c ≤ T1 − T2 hold by
assumption. Hence, we may take the square root of both sides to obtain that us
(
r∗21 | α
)
≤ us
(
r∗31 | α
)
if and only if(√
3 − 1
)
α ≤ √3T1 +
(
2
√
3 − 3
)
T2 +
(√
3 − 2
)
c which is in turn equivalent to α ≤ 32 S +
√
3
2 D−
√
3−1
2 c. Now, it is
straightforward to check that the following ordering is equivalent to c ≤ D, which is true by the defining condition
of Case A.
2T1 + T2 ≤ 32S +
5
6
D − 1
3
c ≤ 3
2
S +
√
3
2
D −
√
3 − 1
2
c ≤ 3
2
S +
9
10
D − 2
5
c ≤ 3T1 − c
Hence, by the previous discussion and after observing that 32 S +
√
3
2 D −
√
3−1
2 c = 3T2 + ∆ −
√
3−1
2 c, we conclude
that the optimal solution r∗ in this case is given by
r∗ =
r
∗
31 =
1
4 (α − 2c − 3T2) , if 2T1 + T2 ≤ α ≤ 3T2 + ∆ −
√
3−1
2 c
r∗21 =
1
2 (α − c − T1 − 2T2) , if 3T2 + ∆ −
√
3−1
2 c ≤ α < 3T1 − c
A4. 3T1 − c ≤ α ≤ 3T1 + c. Now, the supplier’s payoff function is given by
us (r | α) = r ·
q∗21 (r + c) , 0 ≤ r ≤ α − c − T1 − 2T20, else
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and hence, as a quadratic polynomial in r, it is maximized at r∗ = r∗21.
A5. 3T1 + c ≤ α. Now
us (r | α) = r ·

q∗11 (r + c) , 0 ≤ r ≤ α − c − 3T1
q∗21 (r + c) , α − c − 3T1 ≤ r ≤ α − c − T1 − 2T2
0, else
Now, the first part is maximized at r∗11 and the second at r
∗
21. Again, one checks easily that 0 < r
∗
11 < r
∗
21 <
α − c − T1 − 2T2. As in Case A3, in order to determine the maximum of us (r | α) with respect to r we distinguish
three sub-cases.
A5.1. 0 < r∗11 < r
∗
21 ≤ α − c − 3T1. Then the overall maximum of us (r | α) is attained at r∗11. The inequality
r∗21 ≤ α − c − 3T1 holds iff 12 (α − c − T1 − 2T2) ≤ α − c − 3T1 ⇔ α ≥ 32 S + 72 D + c.
A5.2. α − c − 3T1 ≤ r∗11 < r∗21. Then the overall maximum of us (r | α) is attained at r∗21. The inequality
α − c − 3T1 ≤ r∗11 holds iff α − c − 3T1 ≤ 12
(
α − c − 32 T1 − 32 T2
)
⇔ α ≤ 32 S + 3D + c.
A5.3. 0 < r∗11 < α− c−3T1 < r∗21. In this case we need to compare the payoffs us
(
r∗11 | α
)
and us
(
r∗21 | α
)
. The
overall maximum is attained at r∗11 if and only if u
s
(
r∗21 | α
)
≤ us
(
r∗11 | α
)
or equivalently if 18 (α− c− T1 − 2T2)2 ≤
1
6
(
α − c − 32 T1 − 32 T2
)2
. Both terms (α − c − T1 − 2T2) and
(
α − c − 32 T1 − 32 T2
)
are positive since α ≥ 3T1 + c
holds by assumption. Hence, we may take the square root of both sides to obtain that us
(
r∗21 | α
)
≤ us
(
r∗11 | α
)
if
and only if
(
3 − √3
)
T1 +
(
3 − 2√3
)
T2 +
(
2 − √3
)
c ≤
(
2 − √3
)
αwhich is in turn equivalent to 32 S +
(
3
2 +
√
3
)
D+
c ≤ α.
Now, since 32 S +
(
3
2 +
√
3
)
D+c = 3T2 +2∆+c and 3T1 +c ≤ 32 S +3D+c ≤ 32 S +
(
3
2 +
√
3
)
D+c ≤ 32 S + 72 D+c,
we conclude that the optimal solution r∗ in this case is given by
r∗ =
r
∗
21 =
1
2 (α − c − T1 − 2T2) , if 3T1 + c ≤ α ≤ 3T2 + 2∆ + c
r∗11 =
1
2
(
α − c − 32 T1 − 32 T2
)
, if 3T2 + 2∆ + c ≤ α
This concludes case A.
Case B. Let 0 ≤ D < c. Then, 3T1 − c < 2T1 + T2 < T1 + 2T2 + c < min (3T1 + c, 3T2 + 2c) and hence for the
different values of α we have
B1. 0 ≤ α ≤ T1 + 2T2 + c. Now us (r | α) ≡ 0 for all r ∈ R+ and hence r∗ = r ∈ R+.
B2. T1 + 2T2 + c ≤ α ≤ 3T1 + c. Now, the supplier’s payoff function is given by
us (r | α) = r ·
q∗21 (r + c) , 0 ≤ r ≤ α − T1 − 2T2 − c0, else
and hence as a quadratic polynomial in r, it is maximized at r∗ = r∗21.
B3. 3T1 + c ≤ α. This case is identical to A5 above. Collecting the results about the optimal strategy of the
supplier in all sub-cases of A and B, we obtain the claim of Proposition 3.5. 
A.2 Proofs of Section 4
Lemma A.1. The supplier’s payoff function us (r) is continuously differentiable on (0, rH) and
dus
dr
(r) =
2
3
∫ ∞
3T+c+r
(1 − F (x)) dx − 2
3
r (1 − F (3T + c + r)) . (15)
Proof. First observe that since (α − 3T − c − r)+ is non-negative, E(α−3T−c−r)+ = ∫ ∞0 P((α−3T−c−r)+ > y)dy,
see e.g.[Billingsley [1986]] and hence, by a simple change of variable, E(α− 3T − c− r)+ = ∫ ∞3T+c+r (1 − F (x)) dx
which implies that
us (r) =
2
3
r
∫ ∞
3T+c+r
(1 − F (x)) dx for 0 ≤ r < rH . (16)
Hence, to prove the assertion of the Lemma, it suffices to show that ddrE (α − 3T − c − r)+ = −(1− F(3T + c + r)).
Then, equation (15) as well as continuity are implied. So, let
Kh (α) := −1h
[
(α − 3T − c − r − h)+ − (α − 3T − c − r)+] (17)
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and take h > 0. Then,
Kh (α) = 1{α>3T+c+r+h} +
α − 3T − c − r
h
1{3T+c+r<α≤3T+c+r+h}
and therefore limh→0+ Kh (α) = 1{α>3T+c+r}. Since 0 ≤ Kh (α) ≤ 1 for all α, the dominated convergence theorem
implies that limh→0+ E (Kh (α)) = P (α > 3T + c + r). In a similar fashion, one may show that limh→0− E (Kh (α)) =
P (α ≥ 3T + c + r). Since the distribution of α is non-atomic, P (α > 3T + c + r) = P (α ≥ 3T + c + r) and hence,
limh→0 E (Kh (α)) = 1−F (3T + c + r). By eq. (17), limh→0 E (Kh (α)) = − ddrE (α − 3T − c − r)+, which concludes
the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The formulas for us (r) and du
s
dr (r) are immediate using eq. (16), eq. (15), and eq. (9). We
remark that since E (α − 3T − c − r)+ = m (3T + c + r) (1 − F (3T + c + r)), one may be tempted to use the prod-
uct rule to derive its derivative and hence show that us (r) is differentiable. However, the product rule does not
apply, since the two terms in this expression of E (α − 3T − c − r)+ may both be non-differentiable, even if α has
a density and its support is connected (e.g. consider the point rL in case rL > 0). Finally, if r ∈ (0, rH), then
1 − F (3T + c + r) is positive. Hence, equation (10) implies that the critical points r∗ of us (r) (if any) satisfy
r∗ = m (r∗ + 3T + c). 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Due to Lemma 4.1, if a non-zero optimal response of the supplier exists at equilibrium,
it will be a critical point of us (r), i.e. it will satisfy (11). It is easy to see that such a response always exists
when the support of α is bounded, i.e. when αH < ∞. However, this is not the case when αH = ∞. So, let us
determine conditions under which such a critical point exists, is unique and corresponds to a global maximum of
the supplier’s payoff function. To this end, we study the first term of (10), namely g(r) := m (r + 3T + c) − r.
Clearly, g (r) is continuous on (0, rH). We first show that limr→0+ g(r) > 0 by considering cases. If rL > 0, then
for 0 < r < rL, m (r + 3T + c) = E(α) − r − 3T − c. Hence, limr→0+ g(r) = E(α) − 3T − c > rL > 0. If rL ≤ 0, then
we use Proposition 1f of [Hall and Wellner [1981]], according to which m (t) ≥ (E (α) − t)+ with equality if and
only if F (t) = 0 or F (t) = 1. So, take first rL < 0, which implies αL < 3T + c < αH . Hence, 0 < F(3T + c) < 1
and (by Proposition 1f) m (3T + c) > E (α − 3T − c)+ ≥ 0. Hence, limr→0+ g (r) > 0 if rL < 0. Finally, if rL = 0,
then m (3T + c) = m (αL) = E (α) − αL > 0, which again implies that limr→0+ g (r) > 0.
We then examine the behavior of g (r) near rH . If αH < +∞, then limr→rH− g (r) = −rH < 0 and by the
intermediate value theorem an r∗ ∈ (0, rH) exists such that g (r∗) = 0. For αH < +∞, we also notice that to get
uniqueness of the critical point r∗, it suffices to assume that the Mean Residual Lifetime (MRL) of the distribution
of α is decreasing8, in short that F has the DMRL property. On the other hand, if αH = +∞, then the limiting
behavior of m (r) as r increases to infinity may vary, see [Bradley and Gupta [2003a]], and an optimal solution
may not exist. But, if we assume as before that m (r) is decreasing, then g (r) will eventually become negative
and stay negative as r increases and hence, existence along with uniqueness of an r∗ such that g (r∗) = 0 is again
established.
Now, 1 − F (3T + c) > 0 since 3T + c < αH and hence limr→0+ dusdr (r) > 0, i.e. us (r) starts increasing on
(0, rH). Assuming that F has the DMRL property, the first term of (10) is negative in a neighborhood of rH while
the second term goes to 0 from positive values. Hence, du
s
dr (r) < 0 in a neighborhood of rH , i.e u
s (r) is decreasing
as r approaches rH . Clearly, for  sufficiently small, us (r) will take a maximum in the interior of the interval
[, rH − ] if rH < ∞ or a maximum in the interior of the interval [,∞) if rH = ∞. Since us (r) is differentiable,
the maximum will be attained at a critical point of us (r), i.e. at the unique r∗ given implicitly by (11).
Equation (11) actually characterizes r∗ as the fixed point of a translation of the MRL function m (·), namely
of m (· + 3T + c). Its evaluation sometimes has to be numeric, but in one interesting case it may be evaluated
explicitly: If rL > 0, then α−3T−c > 0 for all α, which implies that E(α)−3T−c > 0. Then, if 12 (E (α) − 3T − c) ≤
rL, we get r∗ = 12 (E(α) − 3T − c). To see this, notice that the previous equation is equivalent to m (αL) ≤ rL, i.e.
to m (rL + 3T + c) ≤ rL. Then, by the DMRL property m (r + 3T + c) < r for all r > rL. This implies that r∗ ≤ rL
or equivalently that r∗ + 3T + c ≤ αL. In this case m (r∗ + 3T + c) = E (α) − (r∗ + 3T + c) and hence r∗ will
be given explicitly by r∗ = 12 (E (α) − 3T − c). Intuitively, this special case occurs under the conditions that (a)
the lower bound of the demand αL exceeds the particular threshold 3T + c, (i.e. αL > 3T + c or rL > 0),
and (b) the expected excess of α over its lower bound αL is at most equal to the excess of αL over 3T + c (i.e.
E (α)− αL ≤ αL − 3T − c = rL). Of course, since E (α)− αL > 0, condition (b) suffices. In that case, compare with
the optimal r∗ of the complete information case (Proposition 3.8).
Finally, if rL > 0 and 12 (E (α) − 3T − c) > rL (i.e, if E (α) > rL + αL) we get that r∗ > rL, for if r∗ ≤ rL, then
m (r∗ + 3T + c) ≥ m (αL), i.e. r∗ ≥ E (α) − αL. The latter implies that then rL ≥ E (α) − αL which contradicts the
assumption. 
8We use the terms “decreasing” in the sense of “non-increasing” (i.e. flat spots are permitted), as they do in the pertinent literature, where
this use of the term has been established.
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Proof of Proposition 7.1. For i ∈ N, the best reply correspondence of retailer Ri is given by Lemma 3.2 if we
replace Q j by Q−i. Hence, we may simplify the proof by fixing i ∈ N and distinguishing the following cases:
Case 1. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ (n + 1) T and for N 3 j , i let t∗j = 1n+1α, q∗j = 0. Then, Q∗−i = n−1n+1α ≥ α − 2T . Hence, by
Lemma 3.2, BRi
(
Q∗−i
)
=
(
t∗i , q
∗
i
)
=
(
α
n+1 , 0
)
.
Case 2. Let (n + 1) T < α ≤ (n + 1) T + w and for N 3 j , i let t∗j = T, q∗j = 0. Then Q∗−i = (n − 1) T with
α − w − 2T ≤ Q∗−i < α − 2T . Hence, by Lemma 3.2, BRi
(
Q∗−i
)
=
(
t∗i , q
∗
i
)
= (T, 0).
Case 3. Let (n + 1) T +w < α and for N 3 j , i let t∗j = T, q∗j = 1n+1 (α − (n + 1) T − w). Then Q∗−i = n−1n+1 (α − w) <
α−w− 2T . As above BRi
(
Q∗−i
)
=
(
t∗i , q
∗
i
)
=
(
T, 1n+1 (α − (n + 1) T − w)
)
. Summing up, we obtain the equilibrium
strategies as given in Proposition 7.1. 
A.3 Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Using S for the support of F, we get U = {α | α ∈ S and α > 3T + c} and V = {α | α ∈
S and α ≤ r∗ + 3T + c}. So, V ∩ U = {α | α ∈ S and 3T + c < α ≤ r∗ + 3T + c}, and therefore P (V ∩ U) =
F (r∗ + 3T + c) − F (3T + c) and
P (V | U) = F (r
∗ + 3T + c) − F (3T + c)
1 − F (3T + c)
Since, by assumption E (α) − αL > rL, Theorem 4.2 implies that the supplier will sell at r∗ ∈
(
r+L , rH
)
in
equilibrium. So, there are two cases, either (a) rL > 0 or (b) rL ≤ 0. In case (a), we get 3T + c < αL <
r∗ + 3T + c < αH , hence V ∩ U = [αL, r∗ + 3T + c] ∩ S . In case (b), αL ≤ 3T + c < r∗ + 3T + c < αH , hence
V∩U = (3T + c, r∗ + 3T + c]∩S (notice that for α ≤ 3T +c no transaction would have taken place under complete
information also). Hence, P (V ∩ U) = F (r∗ + 3T + c) − F (3T + c) which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Firstly, we express the distribution function F in terms of the MRL function, e.g. see
[Guess and Proschan [1988]], to get
1 − F (t) = E (α)
m (t)
exp
{
−
∫ t
0
1
m (u)
du
}
for 0 ≤ t < αH (18)
We will use the DMRL property, cf. (12), to derive an upper bound for P (V | U). To this end, we use (18) first
for t = r∗ + 3T + c, then for t = 3T + c, and then, dividing the two equations (division by 0 is no danger, see the
discussion preceding Lemma 5.1), we get
1 − F (r∗ + 3T + c) = (1 − F (3T + c)) m (3T + c)
m (r∗ + 3T + c)
exp
{
−
∫ r∗+3T+c
3T+c
1
m (u)
du
}
.
Hence, since P (V ∩ U) = 1 − F (3T + c) − (1 − F (r∗ + 3T + c)), we have that
P (V ∩ U) = (1 − F (3T + c))
(
1 − m (3T + c)
m (r∗ + 3T + c)
exp
{
−
∫ r∗+3T+c
3T+c
1
m (u)
du
})
,
which shows that P (V | U) = 1− m(3T+c)m(r∗+3T+c) exp
{
− ∫ r∗+3T+c3T+c 1m(u) du}. By inequality (12) for 3T +c ≤ u ≤ r∗+3T +c
and the monotonicity of the exponential function
exp
{
− 1
m (r∗ + 3T + c)
∫ r∗+3T+c
3T+c
du
}
≤ exp
{
−
∫ r∗+3T+c
3T+c
1
m (u)
du
}
.
Using the fact that r∗ = m (r∗ + 3T + c), the last inequality becomes exp {−1} ≤ exp
{
− ∫ r∗+3T+c3T+c 1m(u) du}. Substi-
tuting in P (V | U) we derive the following upper bound for P (V | U)
P (V | U) ≤ 1 − m (3T + c)
m (r∗ + 3T + c)
e−1
Since m (r∗ + 3T + c) ≤ m (3T + c) by the DMRL property, the upper bound may be relaxed to P(V | U) ≤ 1−e−1.
To see that this bound is indeed tight, let α ∼ exp (λ), i.e. f (α) = λe−λα1{0≤α<∞}, with λ > 0 and let T ≥ 0. Since
m (t) =
1
λ
− t ·1{t≤0}, F is DMRL. By Theorem 4.2, the optimal strategy r∗ of the supplier is independent of T, c and
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is given by r∗ = 1
λ
. The conditional probability of no transaction P (V | U) is also independent of T, c and equal
to 1 − e−1 due to the memoryless property of the exponential distribution (i.e. P (α > s + t | α > t) = P (α > s)).
Indeed,
P (V | U) = P (α ≤ r∗ + 3T + c | α > 3T + c)
= 1 − P (α > r∗ + 3T + c | α > 3T + c)
= 1 − P (α > r∗) = F (1/λ) = 1 − e−1
implying that the inequality in (14) is tight over all DMRL distributions. 
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